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NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019

TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON CLOSURE
OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT VOTKINSK AND OF POINTS OF
ENTRY, JUNE 8, 2009

REF: A. RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TEXT FOR A JCIC AGREEMENT ON
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION
OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT
THE MONITORED FACILITY AT VOTKINSK DATED
JANUARY 26 2009 AND ASSOCIATED LETTERS
ON GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND COST
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (E-MAILED TO
WASHINGTON - NO REPORTING CABLE)
1B. GENEVA 441 (JCIC-XXXIV-008)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-009.

12. (U) Meeting Date: June 8, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on June 8, 2009, to discuss closure of START points
of entry (POEs) and documents associated with the completion
of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring
Facility (VPMF). The United States, Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan were represented.

14. (S) The Russian Delegation recapped the work to date on
the documents associated with the closure of monitoring at
Votkinsk and presented Russian drafts of the same for

discussion, stressing the importance of finalizing the documents during this session. The U.S. Delegation acknowledged the work by both sides on the issue, but deferred further discussion of the issue due to the ongoing START Follow-on negotiations.

15. (S) Regarding the closure of START POEs, the parties agreed that no special procedures were required, nor were changes needed to any documents associated with the Treaty, and that all equipment currently stored at U.S. and Russian POEs could be removed with the last few inspection teams exiting from those POEs. The U.S. Delegation indicated that it was pursuing removal of the radioactive source stored at the Moscow POE via a commercial shipping agent; the Russian Delegation offered to assist as necessary.

COMPLETION OF
CONTINUOUS MONITORING
ACTIVITIES AT VOTKINSK

16. (S) Ryzhkov opened the meeting at the Russian Mission and moved straight to the preparation of the documents related to closure of Votkinsk. These included a draft JCIC agreement and two letters -- one on ground transportation and another on settlement of accounts. He noted that, although absent, the Ukrainian Delegation was prepared to sign the documents if the United States and Russian Federation reached agreement. He then provided an update on the status of the documents, reviewing the work conducted at the previous two

JCIC sessions as well as the intersessional periods, and thanked the U.S. Delegation and the legal advisors on both sides for their work in resolving issues and getting the documents to their near-final state. He noted that due to the complex legal and financial issues involved, finalizing these documents was a high priority for the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation had provided drafts of all three documents to the United States through diplomatic channels on January 26, 2009 (REF A), and believed it had fulfilled its obligations on finalizing the documents. Ryzhkov presented texts (identical to REF A), dated June 8, 2009, to the U.S., Belarusian, and Kazakhstani Delegations. He noted that the U.S. Delegation had not yet provided a response, and requested clarification of the U.S. position.

17. (S) Stein thanked Ryzhkov for his summation, and expressed the U.S. Delegation's understanding that this was a significant matter, noting Koshelev's comment in his opening plenary statement that Votkinsk closure was the most important issue on this JCIC session's agenda (REF B). He acknowledged that a great deal of constructive work had been done on the issue, but noted that much had happened since January 2009 when the Russians sent their three draft documents (REF A), not the least of which was a change of Administrations in Washington. It was the view of the United States that, because of the ongoing START Follow-on negotiations, any discussion on this issue should be deferred. The U.S. Delegation acknowledged the Russian appreciation for the previous work, and said it would report the views of the Russian Delegation back to Washington.

18. (S) Ryzhkov asked for comments from the other Parties. Belarus expressed concerns over the transit of U.S. shipments and requested guarantees from the United States that it would not transport hazardous cargo through its territory. These guarantees could be in the form of letters between the Parties.

19. (S) Stein again expressed the U.S. Delegation's appreciation of the work done on the closure documents and said that he would carry Russia's and Belarus' points back to Washington, but reiterated the U.S. position that discussion of the matter should be deferred.

110. (S) Ryzhkov indicated that he understood the U.S.

position and suggested that completion of these documents was more important for the United States as, without these documents, it would be difficult to finance the support required to conclude monitoring activities at Votkinsk. If the documents were not finalized, the United States would have to pay in advance for services and support associated with closure of VPMF. He proposed that, since time was short, the delegations could continue to review and prepare the documents so that they would be ready for signature. Belarus indicated its support for this suggestion. Stein thanked the Russian Delegation for the clarity of its views on the matter, and again deferred further discussion.

CLOSURE OF POINTS OF ENTRY

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov moved on to the second issue for the working group, closure of POEs. The Russian Delegation did not think this was a difficult issue, and assessed that removal of

equipment by each side could be accomplished during the last inspection at a particular POE. Ryzhkov saw no difficulty in the United States removing equipment from Ulan-Ude since it used its own aircraft. Moscow was A^QFbQ advance. The delegation from Belarus noted that there was no inspection equipment at the POE in Minsk, and that its closure would be a formality.

¶12. (S) Stein thanked Ryzhkov for the Russian offer of assistance and delivered the following points.

Begin points:

-- It was the view of the United States that no special procedures needed to be agreed to, nor were changes needed to any documents associated with the treaty related to the closure of the POEs, and that all radiation detection equipment (RDE) currently stored at the Moscow and Ulan-Ude POEs could be removed with the last few inspection teams exiting from those POEs.

-- In addition to the RDE stored at the Moscow POE, there was a radiation source which would either have to be removed via a commercial shipping company or extracted via an inspection aircraft associated with one of the final inspections through that POE.

-- The United States preferred to use the commercial shipping option and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was working with a Lufthansa shipping agent to coordinate that procedure, which was the same method used to ship the source to Moscow in 1992. The United States would pay all costs associated with the removal of the source via commercial shipper.

-- There was no radiation source stored at the Ulan-Ude POE nor was there any other U.S. equipment or radiation source stored at the POEs of the other Parties.

-- It was the view of the United States that Russian equipment stored at U.S. POEs could be removed by inspection teams in a similar fashion. The radiation sources stored and used by Russian inspection teams at U.S. POEs were the property of DTRA and would remain in the United States. Accordingly, the United States believed that there would be no funding impact related to POE closure.

End points.

¶13. (S) Ryzhkov indicated that he understood the U.S. position clearly, and no further discussion was needed on the issue.

¶14. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed Text for a JCIC Agreement on

Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk, dated June 8, 2009, and Associated Letters on Ground Transportation and Cost Settlement Procedures (Reviewed by JCIC language support staff and found to be identical to REF

A.)

¶15. (U) Participants.

U.S,

Mr. Stein
Mr. Beddoes
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Mr. Smith
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich
Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Nurgozhayev

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Petrov
Mr. Serov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶16. (U) Taylor sends.
STORELLA